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ABSTRACT 
1 Due to the increasing number of recommendations for people to 
use Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) to protect their privacy, more 
application developers are creating VPN applications and 
publishing them on the Apple App Store and Google Play Store. In 
this ‘gold rush’, applications are being developed quickly and, in 
turn, not being developed with security in mind. 
This paper investigated a selection of VPN applications 
available on the Apple App Store (for iOS devices) and tested the 
applications for security and privacy issues. This includes testing 
for any traffic being transmitted over plain HTTP, DNS leakage and 
transmission of personally identifiable information (such as phone 
number, International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI), email 
address, MAC address) and evaluating the security of the tunneling 
protocol used by the VPN. 
The testing methodology involved installing VPN applications 
on a test device, simulating network traffic for a pre-defined period 
of time and capturing the traffic. This allows for all traffic to be 
analysed to check for anything being sent without encryption. Other 
issues that often cause de-anonymization with VPN applications 
such as DNS leakage were also considered. 
The research found several common security issues with VPN 
applications tested, with a large majority of applications still using 
HTTP and not HTTPS for transmitting certain data. A large 
majority of the VPN applications failed to route additional user data 
(such as DNS queries) through the VPN tunnel. Furthermore, just 
fifteen of the tested applications were found to have correctly 
implemented the best-recommended tunneling protocol for user 
security. 
Outside of the regular testing criteria, other security anomalies 
were observed with specific applications, which included outdated 
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servers with known vulnerabilities, applications giving themselves 
the ability to perform HTTPS interception and questionable privacy 
policies.  
From the documented vulnerabilities, this research proposes a 
set of recommendations for developers to consider when 
developing VPN applications. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Virtual Private Networks (VPN) were originally designed for 
businesses to fulfil two primary purposes. Firstly, to allow an 
employee encrypted remote access to internal corporate networks 
and services. Secondly, to bridge the network of geographically 
separated corporate sites together over the internet (site to site 
VPN). 
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Recently, companies have begun offering VPNs as a service, 
where users can route all internet traffic through the VPN 
provider’s servers. Routing all traffic through an encrypted VPN 
tunnel to the VPN server minimizes risk of data interception from 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs), while offering better privacy 
and/or security when communicating on open or untrusted 
networks.  
VPNs have been gaining popularity over recent years [1]. This 
growing popularity could be partially attributed to media outlets 
recommending readers to adopt VPNs to avoid tracking by 
governments and ISPs. There are many examples of similar 
recommendations and articles both online and in print [2]. While 
there is accuracy to some claims in the various articles on the 
subject, articles tend to offer poor recommendations on what 
features constitute a secure VPN product. 
A VPN product may not offer a true anonymous service due 
to security weaknesses within their VPN client and/or privacy 
policies. Common examples where a VPN provider may de-
anonymize a VPN user may be through logging IP addresses for 
troubleshooting, recording analytics data, or from requiring an 
email address and/or payment details for a VPN account.  
This research aims to evaluate VPN applications available on 
Apple iPhone’s iOS mobile operating system to establish the state 
of security and privacy offered by VPN providers. To establish this, 
a methodology was built to assess the security and privacy of VPN 
applications and VPN privacy policies. The applications that were 
selected for this research were either free to use or offered a limited 
trial period. All applications were obtained on iOS 11 from the 
Apple App Store. The authors of this paper are unaware of similar 
research that investigates the privacy of VPN clients on the iOS 
platform. 
The contribution of this paper is threefold: 
• To provide an overview of the state of security within 
free and paid for iOS VPN clients. 
• A presented methodology that can be used to evaluate the 
state of the security of VPN clients. 
• A set of guidelines of recommended practices are 
outlined that will allow iOS developers to create secure 
VPN clients.  
2 BACKGROUND 
At present, businesses are becoming increasingly data driven, often 
requiring consumers to surrender personal information to use their 
services. With user data being held by more businesses, this has 
made privacy a more prevalent issue. Studies on user privacy and 
mobile application privacy have been undertaken which indicate 
users are becoming less concerned about their privacy while mobile 
applications are sending more user data than ever. 
Research from Ridley-Siegert [3] asked a selection of people 
their opinions on how their data was used and handled. The study 
found that participants of the study were less concerned about their 
online privacy to a previous 2012 study, showing a reduction of the 
overall concern from 84% to 79% between 2012 and 2015. 
Alongside user attitudes towards privacy, developer attitudes 
towards how users and their data are treated by developers must 
also be considered (this is an influencing factor to the research 
being undertaken). Developers should ensure they are not taking an 
excessive amount of unnecessary data and must also ensure that the 
data is being handled and stored securely. 
 Prior research analyzed different versions of Android 
applications, with releases spanning from 2011 to 2015 [4]. The 
research investigated what user data and device information was 
being sent to the developers and third parties. The results from this 
study demonstrated that, overall, applications have increased how 
much user data is being sent to developers. 
2.1 Definition of Personally Identifiable 
Information 
Personally Identifiable Information (PII) is a term that is used to 
describe any form of information that could identify an individual 
person or device. Ensuring that PII does not end up in the hands of 
an adversary is of critical importance. If, for example, a user was 
using a VPN for security and privacy on public WiFi but the VPN 
service was transmitting a username and password over HTTP, an 
attacker sniffing traffic on the network may be able to steal the 
credentials and then impersonate the user. 
The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) have created a 
flowchart-style document that can quickly determine if an item of 
information could be deemed ‘Personal Data’ [5]. This document 
was partially referenced to create the list of PII as shown in Figure 
1. 
 • Device Identifier 
– IMEI 
– IP Address 
– Device Serial Number • User Identifier 
– Name 
– Banking Details 
– Date of Birth 
– Contact Information (Phone  
Number, Email Address etc.) 
• Location Data 
– Home/Work  
Address. 
– GPS Location • Credentials 
– Username 
– Email Address 
– Password 
Figure 1 PII Data 
2.2 Prior Research 
Prior research into VPN security has been undertaken for mobile 
and desktop clients at a variety of price points. One such paper is 
An Analysis of the Privacy and Security Risks of Android VPN 
Permission-enabled Applications [4], which investigates several 
common issues (which will be described in the next section) that 
can reduce the privacy of VPN users on the Android platform. The 
paper covered a large dataset of 283 applications, but only focused 
on VPN clients within the Android operating system. 
A Glance through the VPN Looking Glass [6] is another piece 
of VPN security research that investigated a significantly smaller 
dataset (just 14 VPN clients) but clients were analyzed on every 
common operating system (iOS, Android, Windows, OS X and 
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Linux). The research involves testing the selection of VPN clients 
for known security issues within VPN clients (such as IPv6 leakage 
and DNS leakage). 
The aforementioned papers show that there are issues present 
within the VPN client ecosystem. The research outlines a variety of 
the vulnerabilities present that could reduce the privacy of a user 
and discuss methods to test for privacy vulnerabilities. 
2.3 VPN Privacy Issues 
There are several common security issues with VPN clients that, if 
present, could reduce the privacy of a user. This section does not 
consider security vulnerabilities of individual VPN client 
applications, but rather on common security issues through 
misconfiguration errors or poor software design. 
2.3.1 DNS Leakage 
A DNS leak is the result of a VPN client making DNS requests to 
a DNS server not controlled by the VPN provider. Making DNS 
requests to a third-party – most commonly an ISP’s DNS server – 
allows that third-party to view the websites or services a user is 
visiting based on the hostnames that the DNS server is being asked 
to resolve. 
If a VPN is being used to avoid tracking by ISPs, then a DNS 
leak to an ISP’s DNS server could negate the purpose of the VPN 
service. The reason for this is that an ISP can monitor and record 
the DNS resolve requests being made from a user’s source IP 
address (outside of the VPN tunnel) [7]. 
If a VPN provider was to run their own DNS server, then this 
would mitigate the issue of a DNS leak as it centralizes trust with 
the developer rather than trusting a third-party DNS provider. 
2.3.2 Tunneling Protocols 
iOS supports a selection of VPN tunneling protocols. Each protocol 
has a variety of benefits and disadvantages, some are more secure 
than others and each has support for different authentication 
mechanisms [8]. The purpose of investigating this security issue is 
to determine if the VPN clients are using a secure, modern 
tunneling protocol (such as a variant that utilizes IPSec) or a less 
secure, older protocol such as L2TP.  
2.3.2.1 IPSec 
IPSec is a protocol that is often combined with other protocols 
(detailed below) that provides enhanced encryption and better 
authentication mechanisms. IPSec relies on two main protocols. 
The Authentication Header (AH), which is used in IPSec to verify 
the source of the traffic and utilizing hashes of the sent data to 
ensure that traffic is not tampered with in transit. The second 
protocol is the ESP which uses symmetric encryption to encrypt 
data being sent between clients [9]. 
IPSec has three methods that can be used for authentication: 
pre-shared keys, encrypted nonce or digital certificates. These 
authentication mechanisms are detailed in the authentication 
mechanisms section. 
2.3.2.2 IKEv2 (with IPSec) 
IPSec is responsible for the integrity checking and encryption part 
of a VPN tunnel, but this is often combined with Internet Key 
Exchange (IKEv2) to exchange keys for authentication purposes. 
This mutual authentication is performed by establishing a security 
association between two parties, in this case the user and the VPN 
server, where the shared secret information is exchanged to allow 
for the communication of the aforementioned AH and ESP 
protocols [10]. 
2.3.2.3 L2TP (with IPSec) 
The Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) is a slightly older tunneling 
protocol that is an advancement of the Point-to-Point Tunneling 
Protocol. It was built in a partnership between the PPTP Forum, 
Cisco and Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). The L2TP 
protocol is defined in RFC2661 [11]. By default, L2TP does not 
encrypt any traffic, as it is used mainly to establish the VPN tunnel. 
For this reason, L2TP is often combined with IPSec and is known 
as ‘L2TP over IPSec’. Securing the L2TP protocol using the IPSec 
suite is defined under RFC3193 [12]. 
2.3.2.4 SSL VPN 
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) VPNs are primarily intended for 
employees to remotely access internal resources within a company. 
An SSL-based VPN typically uses port 443 (HTTPS), so there are 
often no issues with firewalls as this is a well-known port number. 
SSL VPNs are browser-based so there is no need for any operating 
system integration or third-party VPN clients. This also makes 
them very lightweight in terms of CPU/RAM utilization when 
compared to other VPN tunneling protocols [13]. 
2.3.3 Authentication Mechanisms 
Authentication is a key part of a secure VPN infrastructure that 
ensures only valid and legitimate users of a VPN service can access 
the service. There are three common authentication methods which 
are detailed in the sections below  
2.3.3.1 Pre-Shared Keys 
A pre-shared key (PSK) is essentially a password and it 
authenticates in a similar fashion that a user would connect to a 
basic home WiFi network, where one shared ‘password’ is used for 
every user that connects. 
If PSK’s are used for authentication and the PSK is not unique 
for every user, this creates a security weakness. An 
adversary/attacker could impersonate the VPN server and route all 
traffic through the adversary’s VPN server [14]. It is therefore 
recommended not to use non-unique pre-shared keys for 
authentication. 
2.3.3.2 Encrypted Nonce 
A nonce is constructed from randomly generated and unique 
numbers and mitigates the concerns of utilizing non-unique PSKs. 
In the context of VPN authentication, the VPN provider and the 
user must exchange a key to encrypt user’s nonce with the VPN 
provider’s public RSA key. Given that the nonce are unique this 
can help to mitigate replay attacks [15]. 
2.3.3.3 Digital Certificates 
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Digital certificates work in a similar way to an encrypted nonce, 
relying on asymmetric cryptography to encrypt and decrypt data 
[16]. The difference is that digital certificates are issued by a trusted 
certificate authority (in the same way SSL certificates are issued). 
The main advantage to issuing certificates in this way is that 
distribution of certificates is centralized with trusted certificate 
authorities. This also allows certificate authorities to revoke 
certificates that may have been compromised [17]. 
2.3.4 IPv6 Leakage 
Another common issue present within VPN clients that could 
reduce the privacy of a user and allow them to be tracked is through 
IPv6 leakage. This issue occurs when the operating system makes 
requests using IPv6 rather than IPv4. Due to a lack of support by 
some VPN clients, IPv6 requests are routed outside of the secure 
VPN tunnel, potentially leaking user information. This issue is also 
detailed in A Glance through the VPN Looking Glass [6]. 
On the iOS platform this issue should theoretically be 
relatively minor, if a tunneling protocol is in use that does not 
support IPv6 then IPv6 is disabled system wide. The only VPN 
tunneling protocol that supports IPv6 is IKEv2 [8].  
2.4 VPN Anonymity 
Using a VPN can offer a user more privacy, assuming that the VPN 
service is secure and does not suffer from the issues discussed in 
the previous section. However, some VPNs do not make a user 
untraceable, and users that employ VPNs for communications may 
be far from being anonymous [18]. 
Most VPN providers require an account to use the service, 
typically asking for a name, email address or payment information 
on account creation. A user could be personally identified from the 
account information provided. Even VPN providers that do not 
require accounts will often log users’ source IP addresses, which 
could also be used to deanonymize a user. 
WebUser magazine recently released an issue with the front 
page boldly claiming VPNs would allow users’ to ‘stay 100% 
anonymous‘ while offering guidance on what a VPN is and why 
consumers should use a VPN service [19]. The general explanation 
was technically accurate, and a variety of VPN services were 
recommended at different price points. However, the ‘stay 100% 
anonymous’ claim is entirely false, due to the fact most VPN 
services will log PII, thus potentially removing any form of 
anonymity. 
2.5 Threat Modelling 
The threat model of a VPN user must be heavily considered before 
using and purchasing a VPN. Security conscious users, political 
activists, and other users wishing to circumvent geographic 
restrictions to access content may use a VPN. However, as 
acknowledged previously, VPNs are far from anonymous due to 
the information requested by the VPN provider to use the service. 
If the user’s objective is to avoid nation state actors or law 
enforcement, the majority of VPN services will not protect the user 
from this. Many VPN providers have terms in their privacy policies 
that claim they will cooperate with law enforcement investigations. 
One such example is VyprVPN (a product owned by Golden Frog), 
which states in its privacy policy (under the How Golden Frog 
Responds to Criminal Investigations section): 
“Golden Frog cooperates fully with law enforcement agencies, 
yet there must still be a subpoena before Golden Frog provides a 
member’s identifying information - minimal information 
reasonably calculated to identify and no more" [20]. 
3 Procedure 
This procedure outlines the approach to the case study performed 
as part of this research. The procedure tested for prevalent technical 
issues that can affect the privacy of VPN applications. Each stage 
of testing performed is presented to ensure that the test criteria is 
met and to ensure reproducibility. 
The applications tested throughout the research were 
downloaded from the Apple App Store. The applications were 
advertised to be either completely free to use or offer a free trial. 
The applications were found in the Apple App Store by using the 
search queries; "Free VPN", "Free VPN for iPhone", "Secure 
VPN", "Free VPN Anonymous", and "Fast Free VPN". 
3.1 Device Preparation 
To test the applications, an iPhone 6 was used as a test device that 
was running iOS 11.2.2. Automatic updates for both the operating 
systems and installed applications were disabled to prevent any 
possible changes to the results throughout the testing period. 
During the testing of each VPN application, the only other 
application open was the Safari web browser. The Safari web 
browser was used to test for DNS leakage using an online DNS leak 
test tool. No other tabs were open in the browser and no other 
applications were running in the background to mitigate collecting 
unnecessary data that could skew collected results. 
The iPhone was connected to WiFi and had no SIM card 
inserted. This ensured that all data was sent over WiFi, and no data 
was transmitted using a mobile data connection. Internet traffic was 
also mirrored over USB to a computer to capture traffic. 
3.2 Accounts within Applications 
It was determined that there were three categories of accounts 
within VPN applications: 
 
1. An account was required.  
2. An account was optional. 
3. No option to have an account. 
 
Accounts were created in cases where an account was required 
or optional to use the VPN service. This was done to determine if 
any sensitive PII were being transmitted over unsecure HTTP. 
Naturally, when no option for an account was required then no 
account was created.  
3.3 Test parameters 
All VPN applications were tested for the following areas of security 
and privacy: 
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• Data communication (HTTP/HTTPS). 
• DNS leakage. 
• Secure tunneling protocols. 
• Application permissions. 
3.4 Packet Capture 
The study used a technology called Remote Virtual Interfaces 
(RVI) to facilitate packet capture from the iOS device. This 
technology exists exclusively on iOS 5 or later and requires a 
device running OS X/MacOS to use for packet capturing. The iOS 
device had to be connected to the MacOS device using a lightning 
to USB cable. 
With the prerequisites installed (Xcode), running the 
command (shown in Figure 5) in a terminal window created a 
virtual network interface that mirrored the iOS network traffic to a 
virtual network interface on the MacOS device. 
 
rvictl -s <device UDID> 
Figure 2: Command to Start Remote Virtual Interface 
The Unique Device Identifier (UDID) was determined by 
connecting the test device to iTunes and retrieving it from the phone 
information section. The -s flag creates the network interface and 
the -x flag with the same command stops and removes the virtual 
network interface. Once the command was executed, packet 
capturing software (such as Wireshark) could be directed at the 
virtual network interface to allow all traffic to be captured. 
Compared to using a proxy or ARP spoofing, this was the most 
effective method to packet capture traffic as it made no difference 
which subnet each device was on. An additional benefit was there 
was no risk of interfering with other user’s network traffic by 
packet capturing WiFi traffic as the iOS test device is connected to 
the laptop. 
3.5 Analysis of PCAP Files 
The analysis of the captured PCAP files involved several steps. The 
first step analyzed HTTP traffic to check if the application was 
using the HTTP protocol, and if so, whether the HTTP traffic 
contained any data that could be deemed personally identifiable. If 
HTTP was not in use, then HTTPS was used and the application 
was deemed secure from leaking PII in plaintext. 
Due to the sheer amount of PCAP files accumulated over the 
course of the testing, it became infeasible to manually analyze each 
file for the presence of PII. For this reason, a small bash script was 
written to parse the PCAP files for a list of keywords that were 
accumulated through the initial manual PCAP analysis, including 
when applicable information used when setting up any accounts 
with the VPN application. 
3.6 DNS Leakage 
Testing for DNS leakage was handled through a third-party DNS 
leak test website—www.dnsleaktest.com. The VPN connection 
was tested once initiated and through an extended run test using the 
Safari web browser on the iPhone. The test performed made a series 
of DNS requests to determine what DNS provider was being used 
to serve the DNS requests. If any DNS requests were made to any 
servers other than those in control by the VPN provider, then the 
application was determined to be suffering from DNS leakage. The 
DNS cache was cleared between testing each application. 
3.7 Tunneling Protocol 
Ideally, VPN applications should be making use of the ESP 
protocol within the established VPN tunnel. To establish whether 
this was present, a network security monitor called Bro, was used 
to analyze each PCAP file after the testing was completed. This was 
done to offer further analysis and a breakdown of the protocols 
found in the PCAP file. 
3.8 Application Permissions 
The OS permission requests being made by the VPN applications 
were analyzed by interacting with the application and recording 
which OS permissions the application requested. Some permission 
requests (such as VPN and notification) are expected, however, this 
section of the testing procedure was to determine if any applications 
were requesting permission they did not necessarily require (such 
as access to the media library or to contacts on the device).  
4 Results 
This section details the overall results of testing 57 VPN 
applications, outlining how the applications were categorized in the 
Apple App store, what permissions the VPN applications were 
requesting, DNS leakage, tunneling protocols that are used as well 
as examples of PII leakage. The results will additionally review 
some of the more interesting observations discovered while 
undertaking testing. 
4.1 Overall Results 
A total of 57 VPN applications were chosen based upon their 
popularity in the Apple App store, ranging from 1* to 5*. It was 
observed that 13 of the least popular VPN applications available on 
the Apple App Store were generally less reliable than popular 
applications, frequently failing to establish a connection to the VPN 
service. 
4.1.1 VPN Categories 
The Apple App Store does not have one definitive category for 
VPN clients, so it was interesting to see which categories 
application developers chose to categorize their applications under. 
Figure 3 shows the results of how the applications were 
categorized. The productivity and utilities categories on the Apple 
App Store were found to be the most popular choices for 
categorizing VPN applications, however, a few applications were 
additionally found under travel, business, and reference categories. 
There were some applications which were under no category at all. 
4.1.2 Permission 
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Through interacting with applications during testing, the 
permissions applications were requesting or requiring was 
recorded. 6 out of the 57 applications tested were not able to have 
their permissions recorded as they were unable to connect to their 
VPN server.  
Every application naturally required the VPN permission, 17 
of the applications were also requesting permissions to send 
notifications (e.g. if the application had a set amount of data per 
month, notifications were used to inform users when their data 
allowances were running low). 
 
 
Figure 3: Breakdown of Application Categories 
One application required access to GPS to determine user 
location to find the fastest servers to connect to. The only other 
permission requested by any application was by application #56, 
which required access to user’s photo libraries. The permissions are 
broken down in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4: Application Permission Requests 
4.1.3 HTTP within applications 
Figure 5 shows that out of the 57 applications tested, 40 of 
these were determined to be using the HTTP protocol (regardless 
of whether the HTTP traffic contained PII or not). 
 
 
Figure 5: Applications using HTTP or HTTPs 
4.1.4 PII Leakage 
By using keywords within the bash script and verifying the script’s 
results, Figure 6 shows that 22 of the 57 tested applications were 
leaking PII about users. This information included details such as 
usernames, email addresses, passwords, source IP addresses and 
GPS coordinates. The GPS coordinates were either determined 
from geolocation information deduced from the source IP address 
or from the reported device location obtained through GPS 
permissions. 
 
 
Figure 6: Chart of PII Leakage Results 
4.1.5 DNS Leak within applications 
Figure 7 shows that 13 of the 57 VPN applications tested were able 
to communicate with their VPN server, but ultimately failed to 
establish a VPN connection. As such, 44 applications were tested 
for DNS leakage. Of the 44 applications that were tested, 32 
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suffered from a DNS leak. 30 of the VPN applications that suffered 
from a DNS leak were using Google DNS and 2 VPN applications 
were relying on Level 3 Communications (a large 
telecommunications provider) for DNS. This indicated that the 
respective DNS provider that DNS was being leaked to could 
associate DNS requests with a user and, therefore, track websites 
that users visit. 
 
 
Figure 7: Chart of DNS Leak Test 
4.1.6 Protocol Usage 
Ideally, applications should be using the IPSec protocol with IKEv2 
and ESP to ensure secure communications. The results from Figure 
8 show that only 15 of the 57 VPN applications tested were using 
the recommended configuration of IPSec with IKEv2 and ESP. 17 
applications were using IPSEC and IKEv2, 12 applications were 
using IPSEC and ESP and 1 application was just using IPSEC by 
itself. 5 applications were using another type of encryption and 7 of 
the applications could not be tested due to the fact that an VPN 
connection could not be established. 
 
 
Figure 8: Chart of Encryption Protocols in Use 
4.2 Examples of PII Leakage 
This section outlines some of the more critical findings where 
applications were found to be leaking PII using the insecure HTTP 
protocol. 
4.2.1 Application #5 
During testing, application #5 was observed to be sending PII in 
URL parameters. This included the email and password used to 
create an account within the application. The ‘pass’ parameter was 
determined to be hashing the password using MD5 (this was 
verified by cracking the MD5 string and verifying it matched the 
original password). MD5 is a weak hashing algorithm[21] and, 
despite being a marginal improvement over transmitting passwords 
in plain text, it is still a insecure method of securely transmitting 
credentials. 
Application #8 was observed to be sending PPI to a server, 
with the PII enclosed within XML files. This included an email 
address, a password and a unique device identifier. 
4.2.2 Application #21 
Application #21was observed to be sending a large quantity of PII 
over HTTP enclosed within a JSON file. This included the country, 
city, partial postcode and latitude and longitude coordinates of the 
user, as well as the user’s IP address and ISP. 
4.2.3 Application #52 
Application #52 was determined to be transmitting sensitive 
information over HTTP, although not necessarily that of the user. 
The sensitive information transmitted contained an IP address 
(owned by a cloud hosting provider) and credentials used to 
authenticate the user to the VPN service.  
4.3 Notable Observations 
Some interesting results were discovered that were outside of the 
regular testing methodology. These results are outlined below and 
were reported to the developers as security issues. 
4.3.1 Configuration file over HTTP 
Application #52 was found to be downloading the VPN 
configuration file over HTTP. This method of configuration may 
expose the VPN application to man-in-the-middle attacks, where 
an attacker could intercept the configuration file and replace it with 
a malicious configuration file, thus routing all user VPN traffic 
through the malicious VPN server. 
4.3.2 Self-Signed Root Certificate 
During the setup process Application #17 requested permission to 
install a profile on the device. This profile was signed by 
‘VoiceFive Networks, Inc’ with a verified tick. 
Clicking on ‘More Details’ revealed that the profile contained 
VPN settings (as expected), four signing certificates that were 
issued by Symantec and Verisign (trusted certificate authorities on 
iOS), and two signing certificates that were issues by 
‘MobileXpression CA’. The list of trusted root certificates that are 
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preinstalled on iOS does not contain MobileXpression CA, and this 
certificate was self-signed by the application developer.  
Allowing a developer to install a self-signed certificate on the 
device is a security concern. This would theoretically allow the 
application developers to intercept encrypted HTTPS traffic and 
view confidential data such as usernames and passwords for other 
websites, applications and services. It may also allow the 
developers to inject adverts into webpages that users visit. 
When continuing with the installation of the root certificate, 
iOS will specifically warn users that an unmanaged root certificate 
will not be trusted by default and that full trust will need to be 
enabled to proceed. To continue using the VPN application, 
enabling full trust is a requirement. No other application tested 
required that a self-signed root certificate was installed on the 
device, this was an anomaly and generally not the best practice for 
configuring a VPN client on iOS. 
4.3.3 Outdated Web Server 
When analyzing Wireshark packet captures, application #15 was 
determined to be making unusual requests to a directory on a web 
server. Upon visiting the directory using a web browser, it was 
discovered that the server was running Django, which is a Python 
web framework. The developer had left debugging enabled 
publicly, and the web page displayed debugging information 
(including the Django version number). 
The specific version of Django was checked against the 
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database for known 
vulnerabilities. It was determined that the installed version of 
Django was over 4 years old at the time of writing and had multiple 
vulnerabilities that had high severity ratings on the CVE rating 
scale. 
5. DISCUSSION 
This section discusses the results as well providing advice that 
iOS developers can take to improve the overall security of VPN 
applications based on the findings of this research. Implementation 
of the below advice would improve the privacy of a VPN client 
considerably over the VPN clients tested in this study. 
5.1 VPN Categories 
There are a large quantity of VPN applications in the Apple App 
Store. Within the tested results, there were inconsistencies with the 
categorization of applications. VPN applications were 
predominantly categorized under Productivity or Utilities, 
however, some applications within the selection that were tested 
were also categorized under Travel, Business and Reference. 
This inconsistency in VPN application categorization could 
impact how applications are ranked, and what applications are 
displayed to users (e.g. when browsing specific categories for VPN 
applications). Due to the substantial amount of VPN applications 
available, it could be beneficial for Apple to introduce a category 
specifically for VPNs. 
5.2 Permissions 
The results of testing permissions were surprisingly uninteresting, 
with almost every application only requesting a combination of 
VPN and notifications permissions. There were only two 
applications that differed from this. Application #49 additionally 
required GPS permissions, which was used by the application to 
‘find the closest Speed Servers’. 
Although this does make sense from a technical standpoint, it 
stood out as the only application doing this through GPS location. 
Other applications (as evidenced through PII leakage) were able to 
determine approximate location through the user’s IP address rather 
than through explicit GPS coordinates from the device. 
The second application observed to be requesting unusual 
permissions for a VPN was application #56. This application 
required additional access to the photo library. Upon further 
investigation, this permission was requested for another of the 
application’s intended functions that offers users to remove 
duplicate photos from their device. No further investigation was 
done to establish whether this application feature had malicious 
intention as this was beyond the scope of this research. 
5.3 HTTP & PII Leakage within Applications 
It is common for VPN applications to connect to multiple web 
servers on start up to authenticate VPN users, obtain server lists, 
and potentially receive news and ads. The research found that 40 
out of the 57 VPN applications tested were using HTTP to facilitate 
this communication, which sends user information across the 
internet unencrypted. 
Sending potentially confidential user information (such as 
usernames, passwords, phone IMEI numbers and advertising ID’s) 
across the internet without encryption serves to substantially reduce 
the privacy of a user.  
Apple intended to enforce mandatory transport encryption for 
all iOS applications by the end of 2016 [22], but this decision was 
later postponed indefinitely. Even though this decision was 
postponed it is recommended that iOS developers should use 
mandatory transport encryption. When mandatory encryption is 
enforced it will greatly improve the overall level of security 
provided to the end user. 
5.4 DNS Leakage 
DNS leakage was another prevalent issue found over the course of 
application testing. Out of 44 VPN applications that were tested for 
this issue, 32 were found to be leaking DNS to a third-party 
organization. Given that a large majority of the DNS leaks were 
leaking requests to Google DNS servers, it introduces debate 
around user privacy, as the leaked DNS requests will enable Google 
to track the websites and services that the VPN user has visited. 
The recommended best-practice to prevent a DNS leak is to 
ensure that all DNS traffic is routed through the VPN tunnel, and 
preferably to a secure DNS service that advertises an interest in user 
privacy and support for DNS over TLS. Some examples include the 
recently launched Quad9 DNS (built in part by IBM) and the Quad1 
DNS resolver, built in collaboration with Cloudflare. 
Investigation into the Security and Privacy of iOS VPN 
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In terms of deployment from a developer perspective, setting 
the DNS resolver for a VPN tunnel involves implementing the 
NEDNSSettings class within the NetworkExtension framework. 
5.5 Protocol Usage 
Out of the 57 applications that were tested, 15 applications were 
found to be using the best-recommended practice of using the IPSec 
protocol with IKEv2 and ESP. Given the strong security of ESP 
and the features of IKEv2, it was surprising to see such a low 
number of applications supporting both protocols. 
It is recommended that a VPN application should implement 
support for the IKEv2 protocol with the use of ESP, as this is the 
strongest cryptographically, while also supporting IPv6 and 
offering improved stability across network changes. 
Deployment of this protocol relies on the use of the 
NEVPNProtocolIKEv2 and NEVPNProtocolIPSec classes within 
the NetworkExtension framework. 
5.5.1 IPv6 Leakage 
Following the recommendation to implement IKEv2 will result in 
the VPN having support for IPv6. Similar to DNS leakage, IPv6 
leakage happens when IPv6 traffic is not properly routed through 
the VPN tunnel. It is recommended to add support for IPv6 through 
the VPN tunnel using the NEIPv6Route and NEIPv6Settings 
classes within the Network Extension framework. 
5.6 Unnecessary Information Gathering 
Throughout this research, numerous VPN applications were found 
to be leaking PII that could identify a VPN user. Combining this 
with the ever-increasing amount of data breaches affecting 
companies worldwide [23] , there is a substantial risk with handling 
and storing user information. 
On the 25th of May 2018, the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) came into effect, which aims to ensure 
companies handle and store data securely to prevent data breaches. 
This is backed up by the threat of large financial penalties if 
companies were to suffer from a data breach. 
To minimize the risk of data breaches it is important to ensure 
best practices are followed regarding server hardening and 
patching. Additionally, it is advisable for developers not to collect 
unnecessary user data and only gather user data required to provide 
the service. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, this research has proven that some security flaws 
exist within a large selection of VPN applications on the iOS 
platform. One of the most notable problems found in the VPN 
applications tested was the lack of utilizing a secure 
communications protocol (HTTPS) to transmit data. This issue 
could be solved by Apple enforcing mandatory transport encryption 
for all iOS applications (which was announced and then delayed 
indefinitely), which would require all traffic to be sent over HTTPS 
to prevent sensitive information leakage [22]. 
Another prevalent issue found was DNS leakage, with 32 of 
44 VPN applications tested suffering from DNS leaks. This issue 
leads to a substantial reduction in privacy for users, enabling the 
DNS providers to track users browsing activity based on DNS 
resolution requests. It is of critical importance to user privacy that 
VPN developers route all DNS requests through the VPN tunnel, 
while also employing a secure DNS provider. 
It is crucial that developers understand the various risks and 
common security misconfigurations that can cause a reduction to 
user security and implement necessary fixes. The most common 
security misconfigurations have been presented and investigated 
throughout this paper. Recommended guidelines for mitigating 
privacy threats are presented to provide developers advice on 
improving privacy of their VPN applications. 
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